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Abstract. The chapter reviews and critically discusses several ‘behavioral’ aspects of policy 
formulation. First, it makes a conceptual distinction between ‘behavioral’ aspects of policy 
formulation related either to methods or to insights. Second, it discusses several 
methodological aspects of proposing experiments for policy formulation purposes. In 
particular, it reviews the case of conducting randomized controlled experiments in the 
broader context of evidence-based policy tools; refers to an influential taxonomy of 
experiments spanning the continuum from the lab to the field; and discusses the scope, 
limitations, and current directions of each type of experiments within such a flexible toolkit. 
Third, it provides an operational definition of behavioral economics and behavioral science, 
and proposes a taxonomy of policy formulation insights based on the extent to which these 
insights are genuinely inspired by behavioral science. Finally, within the policy formulation 
insights directly inspired by behavioral science, it focuses on the nudging approach to 
illustrate its potential and future challenges from a conceptual and practical perspective. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last few years, ‘behavioral economics’, and, more generally, ‘applied behavioral 
science’ (as per Kahneman, 2012) have gained outstanding momentum among policy-
makers. Several governments in developed countries have constituted ‘behavioral insights 
teams’ within their civil services, including the Nudge Unit in the UK Cabinet Office and the 
Office for Information and Regulatory Affairs (now the Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Team) in the US; analogous initiatives have also been set up within the governments of 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway 
and Singapore (Dolan et al., 2012; Sunstein, 2011; Dolan & Galizzi, 2014a; Annala et al., 
2015). Insights from the behavioral sciences have also attracted increasing attention by 
international institutions: the European Commission has set up a Foresight and Behavioral 
Insights Unit and a Behavioral Economics Team at the Institute for Health and Consumer 
Protection, both at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission; the World Bank’s 
2015 World Development Report—titled Mind, Society and Behavior—addresses the 
psychological, social, and cultural influences on decision making and human behaviour and the 
impact these have on development; and the OECD has promoted a series of high-level 
workshops on the applications of behavioral sciences to policy making 
(http://www.oecd.org/gov/behavioural-economics.htm). 
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Two recent books have systematically discussed the applications of behavioral insights to 
public policy (Shafir, 2012; Oliver, 2013), and a number of articles have explored specific 
areas of policy applications, including savings and pensions (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004; 
Beshears et al., 2011), welfare (Bernheim & Rangel, 2009; Costa-Font, 2011), and health 
(Loewenstein et al., 2007; Volpp et al., 2011; Loewenstein et al., 2012; Galizzi, 2014).  
 
Policy-makers have indeed put forward an array of policies often referred to as ‘behavioral 
policies’, encompassing randomized controlled trials, financial incentives, comparison web 
portals, and nudges, among others. The interventions that fall under the behavioral umbrella 
in policy applications are, however, quite heterogeneous and diverse. It is often unclear to 
which aspect of a policy formulation the term ‘behavioral’ refers to, and practitioners, policy-
makers and researchers often use or assume quite different definitions of ‘behavioral’.   
 
There are two particular, and related, sources of potential misunderstanding in the behavioral 
aspects of policy formulation. First, it is often not clear whether the ‘behavioral’ attribute 
refers to the methods of research or the insights obtained from the research (or to both)—is 
an intervention based on evidence from a randomized controlled trial automatically a 
behavioral policy?  
 
Second, how closely is the conceptual core of these disparate ‘behavioral’ policies related to 
genuine insights from behavioral science? In other words, what ‘behavioral’ insights really 
are behavioral? 
 
This çhapter attempts to conceptually dissect the two sources of misunderstanding in the 
behavioral aspects of policy formulation by building on, and generalizing from, the 
discussion in Galizzi (2014) on behavioral policies in the domain of health.  
 
The chapter first provides an operational definition of behavioral policy formulation and of 
‘behavioral’ economics as opposed to ‘conventional’ economics. To address the two sources 
of possible misunderstanding, a distinction is immediately made between insights and 
methods.  
 
On the methods, the current emphasis on randomized controlled trials (RCTs) is related to the 
broader discussion on the various types of randomized controlled experiments (RCEs) in 
economics, political sciences, and social sciences in general.  
 
On the insights, the focus is on the nature and content (rather than the methodology) of 
behavioral policy formulation. The chapter proposes a taxonomy consisting of five different 
clusters of behavioral policy formulation instruments: preferences-based policies; 
information-based policies; financial incentives; regulation-based policies, including tax- and 
subsidy-based policies; and ‘nudges’. 
 
The discussion then focuses on to which extent these five clusters of supposedly behavioral 
policy formulation instruments depart from the conventional economics view of individual 
behavior and decision-making. It turns out that some of the policy instruments that, in the 
public debate, are typically considered to be behavioral in fact have limited behavioral 
content, and are instead quite well-established tools in the conventional economics toolbox.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 defines behavioral policy 
formulation, behavioral policy, and behavioral economics. Section 3 deals with the question 
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of ‘behavioral’ methods and insights. Section 4 defines: (4.1) preferences-based policies; 
(4.2) information-based policies; (4.3) financial incentives; (4.4) regulation-based policies, 
including tax- and subsidy-based policies; and (4.5) nudges. Finally, a discussion in Section 5 
briefly concludes. 
 
 
2. A definition of ‘behavioral’ policy 
 
The behavioral aspects of policy formulation are closely interlinked with what the literature 
calls more broadly ‘behavioral policy’, or, equivalently, ‘behavioral public policy’ (Shafir, 
2012; Oliver, 2013). Behavioral policy is thus usually defined as a policy intervention that is 
directly inspired by, and designed on, the principles of behavioral research.  
 
But there is no one precise disciplinary ‘label’ to attach to ‘behavioral’ research. Behavioral 
researchers are essentially social and cognitive psychologists, as well as a “growing minority 
of economists - behavioral economists” (Kahneman, 2012, p. ix). Daniel Kahneman proposes 
‘applied behavioral science’ as a common label for the shared activities, methods and 
interests by psychologists and behavioral economists. A growing number of leading 
institutions, in both the academic and the policy arenas, have now adopted this 
comprehensive definition of ‘behavioral science’ as an interdisciplinary area of research 
bringing together insights and methods from social and cognitive psychology, behavioral and 
experimental economics, neuroscience, philosophy, marketing and consumer behavior, 
organizational behavior, sociology, political science, anthropology, biology, medical and 
health sciences, happiness, and well-being research, among others.  
 
In the popular press, as well as among most policy practitioners, however, there is a tendency 
to reduce behavioral science to one of its sub-components, behavioral economics. There are 
several possible reasons for this, including the fact that, traditionally, economics has had a 
stronger influence and traction on policy-making and practice than the other social sciences. 
Another reason may be that, especially in recent decades, conventional economics as a 
discipline has proposed itself as a comprehensive, structured theory that could be applied to 
virtually any social phenomena. Psychology, in contrast, is typically represented as a set of 
ad-hoc theories applicable to specific issues and phenomena. A further reason may be related 
to the ‘imperialistic’ tendency of conventional economics research to expand into the 
domains of other disciplines such as political science, history and sociology (Baron & 
Hannan, 1994; Lazear, 2000). 
 
Whatever the reason for the tendency to reduce behavioral science to its behavioral 
economics component, this synecdoche then requires us to define behavioral economics. A 
definition is provided by the Russell Sage Foundation’s influential Round Table for 
Behavioral Economics, established in 1992 to “devise activities designed to advance this new 
interdisciplinary field [of behavioral economics]”.  
 
The Round Table defines behavioral economics as follows: “Behavioral economics uses 
facts, models, and methods from neighboring sciences to establish descriptively accurate 
findings about human cognitive ability and social interaction and to explore the implications 
of these findings for economic behavior. The most fertile neighboring science in recent 
decades has been psychology, but sociology, anthropology, biology, and other fields can 
usefully influence economics as well” (Russell Sage Foundation, 2016).  
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In essence, behavioral economics is thus defined as the application to ‘conventional’ 
economics of insights from cognitive and social psychology, as well as of cognate disciplines 
like biology, anthropology and sociology, to improve the understanding of economic 
behavior and decision-making.  
 
This definition implicitly defines behavioral economics as departing from, and somehow 
challenging, the traditional or conventional view of economics, which is essentially based on 
the assumption of perfectly “rational individuals who engage in maximizing behavior” 
(Lazear, 2000). In its most stylized and popularized form, the conventional economics view 
relies on four main conceptual ‘pillars’: 
 
1. Preferences: We have a complete and comprehensive set of preferences—spanning 
over all possible factors affecting our utility and well-being—and a clear, conscious, and 
consistent representation of those preferences: our preferences are thus stable both across 
domains/situations, and over time; 
2. Information: Preferences drive our behavior and decision-making: when we decide, 
we process all available information, we rationally ‘optimize’ by calculating the costs and 
benefits of different choices or courses of actions, and deliberately pick the one that most 
closely matches our preferences;  
3. Incentives: Our rational decisions and behavior best serve our own interests and 
maximize our own utility when interacting with others in markets: in equilibrium, markets 
aggregate individual costs/benefits values and translate them into prices;  
4. Regulation: Since we always rationally act in our own best interests, public 
intervention is needed only when markets fail to correctly translate some costs/benefits 
values into prices; this typically occurs in the case of market failures such as ‘externalities’ 
where individual values do not incorporate effects on others’ costs or benefits. 
 
Conventional economics approaches essentially stick to these four conceptual pillars, while 
behavioral economics approaches relax some of these assumptions in light of evidence 
suggesting that, for instance, we may not always act on our own best interests, or we may 
only try to optimize.  
 
 
3. Does ‘behavioral’ refer to methods or insights? Randomized controlled experiments 
and ‘behavioral’ policy. 
 
The first source of potential misunderstanding in the behavioral aspects of policy formulation 
relates to the fact that practitioners and policy-makers tend to define a policy instrument 
under the behavioral umbrella merely because it entails the use of randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs) as a method of generating evidence.  
 
Someone who attended a conference organized by the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Health and Consumer Affairs, for instance, could come away with the impression 
that the key feature of the EC’s various behavioral insights teams is that they pre-test possible 
policy interventions using controlled experiments involving a treatment and a control group 
(European Commission DG SANCO, 2013). Probably the most influential report by the UK’s 
Behavioural Insights Team when it was still within the Cabinet Office illustrates the need to 
conduct randomized controlled trials to develop public policy (Haynes et al., 2012). 
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This emphasis on the use of RCTs as a fundamental defining criterion for ‘behavioral’ 
policies calls for three conceptual clarifications. 
 
First, the use of RCTs has to do with the methods employed to gather evidence for policy 
purposes, not with the content and insights of such evidence. RCTs are certainly not a 
distinguishing feature only of behavioral policy, behavioral science or behavioral economics. 
Outside the context of policy decision-making the use of RCTs is far from novel. All modern 
evidence-based science, medicine, and pharmacology are based on RCTs, starting from the 
pioneering work on scurvy by James Lind in 1747 to the first published RCT in medicine by 
Austin Bradford Hill and colleagues in 1948. Thanks to the ground-breaking methodological 
contributions of Charles Sanders Peirce, Jerzy Neyman, Ronald A. Fisher and others, modern 
science has since long considered the experimental method as ‘the’ scientific method. Even 
in the policy decision-making context, the idea of using versions of the RCTs for policy 
applications has been advocated from several decades (Rubin, 1974; 1980a; 1980b; 1986; 
Ferber & Hirsch, 1978; 1982; Hausman & Wise, 1985; Heckman, 1992; Burtless, 1995). 
 
What is relatively novel in the policy formulation arena is that there is currently, probably for 
the first time ever, a diffuse and open-minded interest by decision-makers and practitioners in 
rolling out rigorous tests of envisaged policy interventions prior to their full-scale 
implementation (Ludwig et al., 2011; Dolan & Galizzi, 2014a).  
 
Second, while the term RCT is now widely en vogue in policy circles, it is often used in a 
quite particular way which deserves a further set of methodological clarifications. To start 
with, in the current policy debate, the term RCT is explicitly or implicitly used to typically 
denote large-scale experiments conducted with entire organizations (e.g. schools, hospitals, 
villages) without necessarily involving the stakeholders in those organizations to explicitly 
express their views or their consent in the envisaged experiments. This is a major conceptual 
difference with respect to RCTs in medicine or pharmacology, where subjects are always 
explicitly asked to give informed consent prior to take part into RCTs, with obvious but 
profound ethical and political implications. The term ‘RCT’ is therefore conceptually 
inappropriate and practically misleading in a policy formulation context, as it conveys the 
impression that subjects have been made aware of being part to a policy experiment and have 
been consulted and given their consent to it, when actually this may not be the case in many 
applications of experiments conducted for policy purposes (including those run by the 
various ‘behavioral insights teams’). 
 
Furthermore, in the current policy debate, RCTs (as intended in the above sense) are often 
improperly contrasted with other empirical methods used to gather evidence to inform policy-
making.  
 
It is true that only well-designed and well-run randomized controlled experiments provide an 
unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect (that is, in empiricists’ jargon, are internally 
valid). Because of the well-known issue of sample selection bias, in fact, it is only by 
randomly assigning subjects to a treatment or to a control group that one can identify the 
causal effect of a policy intervention on an observed outcome (Heckman, 1979; Burtless, 
1995; Angrist & Pischke, 2009; List, 2011; Gerber & Green, 2012). This is why the 
alternative policy evaluation methods that do not use randomization (Ashenfelter, 1978; 
Lalonde, 1986) then need to overcome this ‘original sin’ in their design by exploiting 
‘naturally occurring’ experiments (Ashenfelter & Krueger, 1994; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 
2000), or resorting to identification strategies such as instrumental variables (e.g. Angrist & 
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Krueger, 1991, 2001; Angrist & Imbens, 1995; Angrist et al., 1996); propensity score and 
other matching methods (Rubin, 1973; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1984; Heckman et al., 
1998; Imbens, 2004); difference in differences (e.g. Card, 1992, 1996; Card & Krueger, 1994, 
2000); or regression-discontinuity designs (e.g. Trochim, 1984; Angrist & Lavy, 1999; Hahn 
et al., 2001; Cook, 2008; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008).  
 
On the other hand, RCTs (as intended in the above sense) are only one specific and very 
peculiar type of experiment. It is useful to refer here to the influential taxonomy of 
experiments in economics, and more broadly in social sciences, originally crystalized by 
Harrison and List (2004): conventional lab experiments involve student subjects, abstract 
framing, a lab context, and a set of imposed rules; artefactual field experiments depart from 
conventional lab experiments in that they involve non-student samples; framed field 
experiments add to artefactual field experiments a field context in the commodity, stakes, 
task or information; and, finally, natural field experiments depart from framed field 
experiments in that subjects undertake the tasks in their natural environment, and subjects do 
not know that they take part into an experiment. The main idea beyond natural field 
experiments is von Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty principle’ in physics: the mere act of 
observation and measurement necessarily alters what is being observed and measured.  In key 
areas for policy formulation, such as health, the environment or ethical and pro-social 
behavior, for instance, there are potential randomization biases (i.e. merely knowing that 
random assignment is in place causes the type of persons participating in a randomized study 
to differ from participants in other studies: Kramer & Shapiro, 1984; Heckman & Smith, 
1995); experimenter demand effects (i.e. participants change behavior due to cues about what 
represents ‘appropriate’ behavior for the experimenter: Bardsley, 2005; Levitt & List, 2007a; 
2007b; Zizzo, 2010); Hawthorne effects (i.e. simply knowing they are part of a study makes 
participants feel important and improves their effort and performance: Franke & Kaul, 1978; 
Adair, 1984; Jones, 1992; Levitt & List, 2011); and John Henry effects (i.e. participants who 
perceive that they are in the control group exert greater effort because they treat the 
experiment like a competitive contest and they want to overcome the disadvantage of being 
in the control group: Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
 
Other, more recent, typologies of randomized controlled experiments are online experiments 
(Horton et al., 2011) conducted, for instance, using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
(Paolacci et al., 2010; Horton et al., 2011); virtual experiments on virtual reality settings 
(Fiore at al., 2009); and lab-field experiments that consist of a first-stage intervention under 
controlled conditions (in the lab) linked to a naturalistic situation (in the field) where subjects 
are not aware that their behavior is observed. Lab-field experiments have been used to look at 
the unintended ‘behavioral spillover’ effects of interventions (Dolan & Galizzi, 2014b; 2015; 
Dolan et al., 2015) or at the external validity of lab-based behavioral measures (Galizzi & 
Navarro-Martinez, 2015), and are part of the growing efforts to bridge the gap between the 
lab and the field, especially in policy areas like health that are inherently challenging from a 
methodological perspective (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Kesternich et al., 2013; Hennig-
Schmidt & Wiesen, 2014). 
 
RCT is therefore a vague and misleading term to use for experiments for policy formulation 
purposes as it does not convey key information on the exact nature and typology of the 
experiment. There is not one single type of experiment for policy formulation purposes; 
rather, a broad spectrum of different types of experiments spanning from the lab to the field 
can prove useful. As randomized controlled experiments, all of the experiment types along 
the Harrison and List (2004) spectrum provide unbiased estimates of the average treatment 
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effect. This continuum of randomized controlled experiments (RCEs), therefore, is the 
systematic, and methodologically appropriate, generalization of what popularly referred to as 
RCTs. 
 
It is also worthwhile emphasizing that there is no consensus on whether lab or field 
experiments are superior: both have strengths and weaknesses, and their relative merits have 
been systematically discussed elsewhere (Loewenstein, 1999; Starmer, 1999a; 1999b; Smith, 
2003; Harrison & List, 2004; Guala, 2005; Levitt & List, 2007b, 2008; Bardsley, 2005; Falk 
& Heckman, 2009; Bardsley et al. 2009; Camerer, 2011; Harrison, 2013; Dolan & Galizzi, 
2014a; Kagel, 2015). Briefly, lab experiments allow for high internal validity because of their 
ability to tightly control the environment and frame, minimize confounding factors, closely 
simulate conditions of theoretical models, and replicate past experiments. Furthermore, they 
provide insights into possible patterns prior to moving into the wild, they uncover the 
mechanisms underlying decisions and behavior, and they require significantly fewer 
financial, time and logistical resources than field experiments. Field experiments, on the other 
hand, generally enhance the external validity of experimental results because observations are 
made with subjects, environments, situations, tasks, rules and stakes which are closer to the 
ones occurring in the real world (Brookshire et al., 1987; Galizzi & Navarro-Martinez, 2015; 
Kessler & Vesterlund, 2015). Field experiments, however, come with lesser control and with 
several other limitations when used for policy purposes (Harrison, 2014). Moreover, they are 
inherently more difficult, if not impossible, to replicate. This is clearly a major limitation 
given the increasing attention to the replicability of experimental results in psychology, 
economics and social sciences (Burman et al., 2010; Miguel et al., 2015; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015). 
 
On a related note, it is worthwhile to notice that the way in which RCTs are sometimes 
contrasted to statistical or econometric analysis is also misleading. In fact, running any of the 
randomized controlled experiments along the Harrison and List (2004) spectrum is just the 
first step of the data collection process that allows the behavioral scientist to then conduct in-
depth econometric analysis of experimental data. There is no reason why behavioral scientists 
interested in ‘what works’ should only superficially look at the average treatment effect 
across the control and the treatment groups in an experiment, instead of delving deeper into 
the behavioral nuances and causal mechanisms. Indeed, as witnessed by the burgeoning field 
of ‘behavioral econometrics’ and ‘experimetrics’, randomized controlled experiments and 
econometric analysis are complementary, not substitute, methods (Andersen et al., 2010; 
Harrison et al., 2015; Moffatt, 2015). 
 
The third and last methodological clarification on ‘behavioral’ methods relates to the often 
proclaimed superiority of RCTs in terms of generalizability— the question of what other 
populations, settings, contexts or domains the findings from an experiment can be 
generalized to (Al-Ubaydli & List, 2015).  
 
There are three conceptually distinct threats to generalizability. The first threat comes 
essentially from participation bias. Unlike natural field experiments, conventional lab 
experiments (but also artefactual and framed field experiments, and, as noted above, RCTs) 
recruit participants through an explicit invitation to take part in an experiment. As a result, 
there is bias not only because the potential participants—university students—self-select into 
universities, but also because subjects who choose to participate in experiments may be 
inherently different in their underlying characteristics from subjects who choose not to take 
part. Policy-makers should therefore be aware that, because of the participation bias, even if 
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the initial sample of subjects is indeed representative of the target (or the general) population, 
the resulting sub-sample of actual respondents may not be. Students participating in lab 
experiments, for instance, have been found to be more curious (Slonim et al., 2013) and more 
motivated by financial incentives (Krawczyk, 2011; Charness et al., 2013).  
 
The second threat comes from the fact that the environment, context and frame of the 
experimental decisions and tasks in the lab may not be representative of real situations 
encountered by subjects in natural settings. This limitation can be overcome by redesigning 
tasks and contexts to more closely match naturalistic situations that subjects are more familiar 
with in real life—that is, to design framed field experiments in the sense of Harrison and List 
(2004) (e.g. Harrison et al, 2007; Harrison & List, 2008).  
 
The last threat to generalizability is that students are, clearly, a peculiar sample of 
experimental subjects that is not representative of the general population (Enis et al., 1972; 
Cunningham et al., 1974). For instance, students act less cooperatively and trustfully in social 
preferences games (Bellemare & Kroger, 2007). If students behave differently, then, an 
extrapolation of their behavior to the general population would be biased even after 
controlling for socio-demographics (Levitt & List, 2007a; Exadaktylos et al., 2013). 
 
To overcome these limitations, a small but growing number of researchers have started 
running artefactual field experiments with representative samples of the population rather 
than just students (Andersen et al., 2008, 2014; Bellemare et al, 2008; Galizzi, 2012; Galizzi 
et al., 2016a,b).  
 
4. A taxonomy of policy formulation instruments 
 
A second source of potential misunderstanding in the behavioral aspects of policy 
formulation is concerned with the nature and insights, rather than the methods, of the 
behavioral policies. When formulating policies, researchers and decision-makers are 
ultimately interested in knowing which type of policies work in effectively changing 
behavior. Rather than resolving the fundamental issue of whether the assumptions of 
conventional or behavioral economics are correct at a general level, economists and social 
scientists are increasingly embracing a so-called pragmatic approach (Galizzi, 2014; 
Bhargava and Loewenstein, 2015; Chetty, 2015; Laibson and List, 2015). In essence, this 
approach considers behavioral economics as a natural progression of conventional 
economics, rather than a fundamental challenge to it, and thus combines insights from both 
conventional and behavioral economics that have proved to work effectively for public policy 
purposes. To better understand the conceptual background underpinning such a pragmatic 
approach to behavioral insights, it is important to explicitly describe the extent to which 
different behavioral policies actually depart from the conventional economics paradigm.  
 
A taxonomy is proposed of five different clusters of policy formulation instruments: 
preferences-based policies; information-based policies; financial incentives; regulation-based 
policies including tax- and subsidy-based policies; and nudges. Before going into the details 
of each class of policies, Figure 24.1 graphically summarizes how the different clusters of 
policy formulation instruments relate to, or depart from, the conventional economics model.  
 
[Figure 24.1 here] 
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In the framework, preferences-based policies are directly related to the first pillar of the 
conventional economics model, and for this reason one can categorize them under the 
conventional rather than the behavioral economics umbrella. Similarly, it is possible to 
closely associate a specific pillar of conventional economics with information-based policies 
(pillar 2), financial incentives (pillar 3), and regulation-based policies, including tax- and 
subsidy-based policies (pillar 4).  
 
Informational policies and financial incentives can also be inspired by behavioral economics 
and behavioral science. In that case, these behaviorally inspired information-based policies 
and financial incentives can be grouped under the ‘behavioral’ umbrella. 
 
According to the above framework, policies based on nudges substantially depart from 
conventional economics, as they openly challenge its pillars 1-3. Nudges can thus be viewed 
as a cluster of policy formulation instruments that are most closely and comprehensively 
inspired by behavioral science research. The following sub-sections review the rationale 
beyond each element of the taxonomy in greater detail. 
 
4.1. Preferences-based policies. 
 
The first cluster of policy formulation instruments are what can be called preferences-based 
policies. These are essentially based on the idea of providing citizens with broad sets and 
menus of choices from which they select their most favorite option. The broader these sets of 
choices are, the larger the set of possible profiles of preferences that could be satisfied.  
 
In the U.S. health policy context, for example, under the George W. Bush administration, the 
Medicare Part D website was launched in 2006 to help seniors choose among a wide variety 
of different drug plans provided by private healthcare companies. Bush explained his reform 
of Medicare Part D by saying “The more choices you have, the more likely it is you’ll be able 
to find a program that suits your specific needs” (White House, 2006). 
 
Similarly, in October 2013 the so-called Obamacare reform launched the exchange portal 
https://www.healthcare.gov/ to help the 50 million US citizens without health insurance to 
compare, in a systematic way, the profiles of the healthcare insurances in 36 US states. 
Similar policies have been implemented, mainly in the US and the UK, in the form of internet 
comparison and ranking websites in several policy formulation areas, such as health 
(hospitals and doctors rating websites: Galizzi et al., 2012), education (school ratings), and 
pensions and savings.  
 
While more choice is almost always good, especially when it fosters competition on the 
supply side, as in the Obamacare example, there is no genuine behavioral insight in these 
policies. This cluster of policies is actually soundly grounded on conventional economics: 
they assume that people have clear preferences over clinical treatments, diagnostic tests, 
insurance and pension schemes, schools, and so on, and that a broader set of choices will help 
them find their most preferred option. This is fully consistent with conventional economics 
(pillar 1).  
 
From a behavioral science perspective, the potential benefit of broadening the choice set of 
options can be partly, or completely, offset by the paralyzing effect of having too many 
options among which to choose. As the ‘tyranny of choice’ literature shows, having more 
options often leads to worse, rather than better, choices, because making choices is effortful, 
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tiring and can generate anxiety (Iyengar & Lepper, 2005; Salecl, 2010). This is also the 
reason why we often seek advices and suggestions; imitate what other do or just follow the 
crowd; or stick to default options (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
 
The second, methodologically more profound consideration is that it is not easy to 
demonstrate a rigorous link between larger choice sets and better decisions or behavior. 
Empirically answering this question entails facing the ‘curse’ of the ‘revealed preferences’ 
argument in economics. In practice, it is often impossible to empirically identify the effect of 
broader choice sets on individual behavior, simply because economists traditionally assume 
that behavior is just the manifestation of underlying preferences. Therefore, as in most cases 
we do not directly observe preferences and we only observe behavior, any type of behavior, 
even the most extravagant, can be easily justifiable in light of some latent, possibly ‘exotic’, 
preferences (Loewenstein, 2007).  
 
From a conceptual point of view, the only way to rigorously test the effectiveness of 
preference-based policies would be to directly measure individual preferences prior to the 
policy intervention and then to directly observe decision-making and behavior under different 
conditions where the number of options in the choice sets is systematically manipulated. 
Rigorous evidence on this point is scarce in most policy formulation contexts. Galizzi (2014) 
further illustrates the conceptual challenges and practical intricacies of this approach for the 
health policy domain.  
 
 
4.2. Information-based policies. 
 
Proceeding down the list, the next cluster of policy formulation instruments is centered on the 
idea of providing information to citizens and consumers to enable them to formulate better 
decisions.  
 
Information-based policies are quite firmly grounded on conventional economics: accessing 
more, or better, information enables us to make better decisions and plans (pillar 2). It is 
worth mentioning three considerations about the effectiveness of information-based policies. 
First, the bulk of research in behavioral science suggests that merely providing more 
information is generally effective in raising awareness, but does not necessarily lead to 
significant and sustained change in behavior. Second, providing more information can 
actually trigger unintended spillover effects (Dolan & Galizzi, 2015).  Third, policy 
interventions seem to be particularly effective when the type and the design of the 
information provided is directly inspired to, and ‘supercharged’ by, genuine insights from the 
behavioral science (e.g. the ‘informational nudges’ in Bhargava & Loewenstein, 2015). 
Galizzi (2014) further illustrates these considerations in the health policy context.  
 
 
4.3. Financial incentives. 
 
Next in the list are those policy formulation instruments based on financial incentives. A 
premise is in order here. We consider in such a cluster only the policies based on the idea of 
providing monetary incentives conditional to a specific change in behavior, what economists 
often called Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT): for instance, paying smokers £100 when they 
quit smoking, or giving £50 on completion of a professional development course.  
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It is important to distinguish these policies from other related policy instruments: providing 
monetary incentives based on a predefined action or change in behavior makes the financial 
incentives inherently different from subsidies or taxes.  
 
Taxes and subsidies, of course, aim to (and are often able to) cause changes in behavior. But 
they do so by directly interfering with market prices. Financial incentives, on the contrary, do 
not alter market prices.  
 
Following the above conceptual framework, however, financial incentives rely on limited 
behavioral insight, and are not a distinguishing feature of behavioral economics. Incentives 
are actually one of the main hallmarks of conventional economics, being directly related to 
pillar 3 of the above framework. Economics as a social science can actually be defined 
largely as the study of incentives and their impact on changing behavior: according to the 
‘basic law of behavior’ (Gneezy et al., 2011), once a well-designed incentive is introduced, 
behavior should change in the envisaged direction. 
 
There is strong evidence that purely monetary conditional incentives tend to work in the short 
run, but mixed evidence on whether they are capable of leading to sustained changes in 
behavior, especially after they are removed.  
 
There is also compelling evidence that financial incentives work effectively when their 
design is directly inspired, and ‘supercharged’, by genuine insights from behavioral sciences. 
In particular, incentives work when, in coherence with the ‘asymmetric paternalism’ 
approach by Camerer et al. (2003) and the ‘libertarian paternalism’ approach by Thaler and 
Sunstein (2003; 2008), they are designed around human biases, in the attempt to help people 
to change behavior. From this perspective, ‘behaviorally’ supercharged financial incentives 
can be seen as an application of the ‘nudging’ policy approach, which is directly inspired by 
behavioral economics (see section 4.5).  
 
An archetypical example of these behaviorally ‘supercharged’ incentives are those used for 
healthier behaviors by George Loewenstein, Kevin Volpp and colleagues at the Centre for 
Health Incentives and Behavioral Economics at (CHIBE) (Loewenstein et al., 2007; Volpp et 
al., 2011; Loewenstein et al., 2012). In their set of experiments on weight loss, for instance, 
incentives proved to work when they were designed to account for, and lever on, our biases. 
These include the tendencies to over-evaluate small probabilities (e.g. a 10% probability of 
paying $100, instead of a 100% probability of paying $10); attach a greater value to losses 
than gains of the same amount (e.g. by asking subjects to put their own money down in 
deposits that are then matched 1:1, and then deducting money from these deposits any time 
subjects fail to change behavior, playing on subjects’ aversion to lose their deposit); be over-
optimistic about personal achievements (e.g. when asked to put money down as a deposit, 
most people believe they will succeed in losing weight and do put down the money); 
appreciate immediate feedback on our actions (e.g. by providing immediate, personalized, 
and punctual feedback by text messages for both rewards and punishments); regret the 
actions we did not take in the past (e.g. by informing subjects about the money they could 
have earned if they had indeed changed behavior any time they did not). Galizzi (2014) 
illustrates these points further in the broader area of financial incentives in health.  
 
A relatively underexplored, but highly promising area for policy formulation purposes is the 
study of the optimal combination of financial incentives and ‘nudges’ (Dolan & Galizzi, 
2014b; Chetty, 2015). A further area of interest for policy formulation purposes is related to 
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the unintended consequences of financial incentives, and leads to the new, promising, field of 
‘behavioral spillovers’ of policy interventions (Dolan & Galizzi, 2014b; Dolan & Galizzi, 
2015;  (Dolan et al., 2015). 
 
 
4.4. Regulation-based policies, including tax- and subsidies-based policies 
 
Next on the list are policy formulation instruments based on regulation, including those based 
on taxes and subsidies. It is easy to argue that these policies are firmly grounded on 
conventional economics, in particular on pillar 4. They are essentially interventions related 
to, or directly inspired by, the long and noble history of market regulation in public 
economics; that is, in the attempt to overcome market failures, the policy-maker directly 
intervenes in markets to realign market forces and prices.  
 
The most typical example of market failures in practice are ‘externalities’ (Pigou, 1920), 
when markets fail to take into account the overall social costs and benefits of goods and 
services and do not adequately reflect them in prices. The classic public economics 
instruments to correct such externalities are taxes and subsidies, for instance, carbon taxes 
levied on carbon- and oil-based energy resources.  
 
It is well-known from public economics that regulations, taxes and subsidies are, 
conceptually, the most suitable forms of policy interventions to address and correct 
externalities, and successful real-world examples of implementation of these policies is 
abundant in both developed and developing countries. The point here is that, although these 
interventions are clearly inspired by conventional rather than behavioral economics, there is 
an immense potential to combine these traditional but effective public economics tools with 
new insights from the behavioral science. For instance, how can we design specific schemes 
around well-known human biases so that we can ‘supercharge’ taxes and subsidies with 
behavioral insights to enhance their long-term effectiveness? This seems one of the most 
exciting and promising areas where more experimental evidence is currently needed in 
behavioral public policy. 
 
 
4.5. Nudges 
 
Finally, some ‘behavioral’ policies are inspired by the idea of ‘nudging’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008). ‘Nudges’ essentially consist of changes in the decision environment (the so-called 
‘choice architecture’), designed on the basis of behavioral evidence, to trigger changes in 
behavior occurring at an automatic, or unconscious, level. Among many possible examples, 
there is the well-known case of changing the default option in organ donation statements 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Other examples in the health context are the behavioral 
interventions to nudge healthy eating: simply relocating fruits and vegetables in more salient 
spots in high schools cafeterias significantly increases their consumption (Hanks et al., 2012), 
while serving food in small plates, or in plates that have a high color contrast with the served 
food (e.g. white plates for spaghetti with tomato sauce) lead to significantly lower food 
intakes (Wansink & Van Ittersum, 2006; Van Ittersum & Wansink, 2012).  
 
Unlike the other behaviorally inspired policies discussed above, nudges do not involve any 
financial incentives or release any new piece of information; they merely change the 
environment where choices and actions are taken.  
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This is quite a broad category that encompasses a vast range of policy instruments levering 
on human decision biases such as the ones introduced above and many others: status quo and 
default bias, loss aversion, procrastination, sunk cost fallacy, halo effects, anchoring, 
overweighting of small probabilities, illusion of control, availability bias, saliency and 
framing effects, present bias, confirmation bias, adaptation, and the ostrich effect, to name 
just a few (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Kahneman, 2011).  
 
Nudges are the cluster of policy formulation instruments that are most genuinely and firmly 
grounded on insights from the behavioral sciences. For this reason, ‘nudging’ interventions 
should be regarded as the only group of policy formulation instruments that comfortably sit 
under the umbrella of behavioral, rather than conventional, economics. They are, in fact, 
essentially based on two findings by behavioral economics and applied behavioral science.  
 
First, a great part of human behavior is automatic and non-conscious. This is consistent with 
the idea that our judgment and decision-making are informed by two cognitive interacting 
systems: a fast and automatic (non-conscious) system (‘System 1’) and a slow and 
deliberative (conscious) system (‘System 2’) (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman 2003, 
2011). 
 
Second, related to this, we often make mistakes and errors in judgment and decision-making 
and fall prey to a broad range of biases and influences from environmental cues, and to a 
large extent may even be unsure of what we actually want. According to the behavioral view, 
our judgments and preferences are malleable in that they can be affected and shifted, even 
substantially, by subtle differences in the social environment, the decision frame, and the 
cognitive or visual representations of alternatives. To the extreme, our evaluations and 
preferences are constructed on the moment in a given situation, and are thus affected by 
changes in the choice environment (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). Such shifts and changes 
can actually occur even when we are not consciously aware of it. 
 
Both ideas are at odds with the conventional economics idea that we make rational 
deliberations about what is optimal given our stable set of preferences, and we then undertake 
a full and coherent plan of action. In this view, in the long run our actions and decisions thus 
fluctuate around, and reveal, our stable set of preferences, so that we do not make systematic 
errors and biases. The very core of conventional economics as summarized in ‘pillars’ 1-2 is 
about rational deliberative decision-making. 
 
It is mainly on this ground that nudging policies challenge the conventional economics view. 
Nudges, however, do not interfere with the sets of options available to individuals, nor with 
market mechanisms, and do not distort the behavior of those who act rationally. Nudges are 
thus less intrusive in the market mechanisms than taxes or subsidies.  
 
Under the perspective of the degree of ‘intrusiveness’ of policy formulation instruments, it is 
possible to establish a parallel between taxes and subsidies, on one side, and nudges, on the 
other. Taxes and subsidies are levied to deal with externalities and market failures. If the aim 
of the policy is indeed to correct these externalities, taxes and subsidies seem the most 
appropriate conventional economics tools. 
 
Nudges, on the other hand, are best employed to deal with ‘internalities’ (Galizzi, 2014; 
Bhargava & Loewenstein, 2015). Internalities are essentially costs that we impose on 
 14 
ourselves, and that we do not (sufficiently) take into account in our decisions (Herrnstein et 
al., 1993). These internalities’ costs originate from our own errors and failures in judgment 
and decision-making, rather than from market failures.  
 
Internalities are perhaps a more fundamental source of flaws and failures than externalities, 
as they pre-exist to markets and economic institutions. They also represent a bigger challenge 
as they cannot be removed by conventional policy formulation instruments such as taxes and 
subsidies. In principle, the internal failures and biases in human decision-making likely 
survive even when externalities are addressed by direct market intervention. 
 
Because the application of nudges to policy formulation is relatively recent, it is perhaps 
premature to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of nudges based on systematic reviews of 
the evidence (Marteau et al., 2011; Loewenstein et al., 2012). The picture gathered by 
different streams of literature, however, is quite clear in suggesting that even subtle changes 
in the ‘choice architecture’ can lead to significant changes in behavior in a variety of policy 
formulation domains. An interesting area of investigation for policy formulation purposes is 
related to the recent evidence on the unintended ‘behavioral spillovers’ of nudges (Dolan & 
Galizzi, 2015; Loewenstein et al., 2015).  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
There is an increasing interest in applying behavioral insights to policy formulation 
challenges. Researchers and policy-makers have recently discussed a range of diverse policy 
formulation instruments whose terms are often used interchangeably and described as 
‘behavioral’. 
 
We provide a critical review of two intertwined conceptual challenges related to these 
behavioral policies. We start by making a distinction between two main ingredients of so-
called ‘behavioral’ public policies, namely methods and insights. 
 
We then argue that what is often indicated as an inherent ‘behavioral’ aspect of policy 
formulation is simply the use of the experimental method to assess the effectiveness of a 
policy intervention. On this respect, we argue that, while the experimental method represent 
quite an innovation in the policy formulation arena, it is not a unique feature of ‘behavioral’ 
policies nor of behavioral economics.  
 
We also argue that reducing the use of the experimental method for policy purposes to the so-
called Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) is both conceptually misleading and over-
simplistic, since it overlooks the richness of the toolbox of different typologies of randomized 
controlled experiments (RCEs) spanning the spectrum between the lab and the field in the 
sense of Harrison and List (2004).   
 
We then argue that to assess the real behavioral component of a behavioral policy 
formulation, we should pay close attention to what extent the policy is inspired by genuine 
insights from the behavioral sciences. To achieve this, we propose a taxonomy to classify 
policy formulation instruments in five clusters: preferences-based policies; information-based 
policies; financial incentives; regulation-based policies, including tax- and subsidy-based 
policies; and nudges.  
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It is possible to look at these five classes of policy formulation instruments in terms of how 
far away they move from conventional economics. Policy formulation instruments aiming to 
provide broader sets of choices, more information, financial incentives, or to use taxes and 
subsidies (the first four ‘clusters’) are closer in their conception to conventional than 
behavioral economics.  
 
Policy formulation instruments based on the nudging approach are directly inspired by 
insights from behavioral economics, although behavioral insights have also been applied to 
the design of information-based policies and financial incentives, and in the near future can 
be fruitfully combined with regulation-based policies. 
 
While policy formulation instruments genuinely inspired by behavioral economics can 
successfully address internalities failures, they are unlikely to effectively deal with 
externalities and market failures that are better addressed by conventional economics 
interventions, such as taxes, subsidies, and other forms of regulation. There is, however, a 
widely unexplored potential to enhance the effectiveness of regulatory schemes using insights 
genuinely inspired by the behavioral sciences. 
 
We conclude with two main considerations that highlight two parallel complementarities in 
the behavioral aspects of policy formulation, the first related to behavioral methods, the 
second to behavioral insights.  
 
On methods, although randomized controlled experiments are not a distinguishing feature of 
behavioral economics or behavioral policy formulation, their growing employment by policy-
makers should be welcome for formulating, testing, assessing, and fine-tuning policy 
interventions. In particular, the systematic use of a broad spectrum of complementary 
randomized controlled experiments in the lab and the field should be advocated as a powerful 
approach for finding out what works and does not work for policy formulation purposes, and 
for innovatively integrating the often detached phases of policy evaluation, cost-effectiveness 
analysis, subjective well-being measurement, and welfare analysis (Dolan & Galizzi, 2014a; 
Harrison, 2014; Chetty, 2015). In close association with econometric analysis and through 
innovative ‘behavioral data linking’ designs, such a flexible toolbox of complementary 
experiments can also be combined with the fast-growing wealth of survey data, 
administrative records, online panels, smart cards, and biomarkers to kick off a genuine 
revolution in the way evidence is used to inform policy decision-making (Jenkins at al., 2008; 
Dolan & Galizzi, 2014a, 2015; Galizzi et al., 2016a,b). 
 
On insights, among economists and social scientists working in public policy areas there is 
now an increasing tendency to emphasize the complementarities, rather than the 
contradictions, between conventional and behavioral economics (Galizzi, 2014; Bhargava & 
Loewenstein, 2015; Chetty, 2015; Laibson & List, 2015). In this recent view, rather than 
challenging or rejecting conventional economics, behavioral economics is seen as a natural 
augmentation or progression of conventional economics. It is now widely recognized that 
insights from behavioral economics offer important policy tools that can be used to change 
behavior, from default options to nudges, to ‘behaviorally supercharged’ incentives. In policy 
formulation, these behavioral insights also provide better predictions of the conditions under 
which policy interventions could work, and of the mechanisms leading to behavioral change 
or to unintended ‘behavioral spillover’ effects (Dolan & Galizzi, 2015). Moreover, behavioral 
insights can also help to generate welfare analysis in policy formulation areas where 
individual choices suffer from imperfect attention or from the above described behavioral 
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biases; where individual preferences are not consistent; or where ‘decision’ utilities typically 
differ from ‘experience’ utilities (Kahneman et al., 1997; Kahneman & Sugden, 2005; Dolan 
& Kahneman, 2008). This tendency calls for an even more systematic integration of 
perspectives for policy formulation purposes, by breaking down the traditional disciplinary 
silos, and by cross-fertilizing ‘behavioral’ science insights from a broad range of fields, from 
economics and political science to psychology, from neuroscience to biology, from 
philosophy to happiness and wellbeing research (Dolan & Galizzi, 2014a). 
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